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An Empirical Analysis of the Factors Affecting 
Bank Crises in Japan : Learning Points               
for Bangladesh
- A.S.M. Sohel Azad *
Abstract
         This paper analyzes the factors that affect bank crises in Japan. There are numerous 
factors, qualitative and quantitative, identified from the analysis. For the quantitative analysis, 
the study employs the factor analysis, which detects three major components of factors that 
affect banking or financial crises in Japan. These are (i) common macro factors (ii) bank 
sensitive micro factors and (iii) household spending related factors. There are other factors, for 
example, policy dilemma, delayed or faulty deregulation measures and weak banking activities, 
which are not extracted from the factor analysis but adversely affect bank crises in Japan and 
hence discussed in details. The paper indicates some policy implications for the 
banking/financial sector of  Bangladesh. 
1.      Introduction
       The first banking crisis hit Japan in 1927. But the Japanese banking 
industry faced the worst of its kind after the burst of bubble in the early 1990s. 
To overcome the financial crisis and to establish a sound banking system, the 
regulatory authorities (Financial Supervisory/Service Agency), bankers and the 
economists have suggested several remedies throughout the 1990s after the 
collapse of twin bubbles in stock and land prices. Some of the measures have 
been proved to be effective but some of them ineffective. 
       Japanese economy is predominantly bank oriented, where a large 
proportion of corporate finance is provided by the banks. Its financial system is 
somewhat like Germany but different from USA or Anglo-American Model 
where corporations largely depend on direct financing. The Japanese financial 
system is not market-oriented. Hence, the capital market in Japan is neither 
organized nor developed because the development of the same was restrained 
by the government . But, given these limitations, the financial system that Japan 
still nurtures has been proved to be the key factor behind its postwar economic 
success, when the banks, both regional and central, provided necessary funds to 
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high growth industrial sectors. With the economic growth, savings rate also 
increased dramatically to further strengthen its stand of indirect finance. 
      Japan's financial system can be characterized by such features like              
(i) historically high savings (ii) the enormous government owned and operated 
postal savings and government guided allocation of savings (iii) heavy 
dependence on indirect/bank finance (iv) immaturity of capital markets          
(v) corporate governance by main banks and (vi) financial convoy 
arrangements (Yoshino et al. 2000). 
       The issue of financial/banking crisis has gained momentum internationally 
in the last few years particularly in the 1990s, when the cost of crises in the 
financial industry has been severe in both developed and transition economies. 
Even in the 1980s, the financial crisis in terms of the magnitudes of bubbles and 
stagnations has been painful in advanced countries. The Table 1 shows the 
magnitudes of bubbles and stagnations in selected developed countries 
including Japan. It is evident that Japan experienced the worst case.               
The magnitudes of bubbles in Japan  were slightly above the average level but 
no country experienced the prolonged stagnation after the bubble period like 
Japan. For this, many Japanese and non-Japanese economists attribute Japan's 
stagnation to the 'bubble' and burst.
Table 1 : Magnitudes of Bubbles and Stagnations in  
Advanced Countries (%) 
 
Countries Period of Bubble Magnitudes of 
Bubbles* 
Magnitudes of 
Stagnations** 
Australia 1984 - 1989 7.2 0.9 
Austria 1988 - 1991 4.4 -6.1 
Belgium 1987 - 1990 4.1 -3.8 
Denmark 1982 - 1986 5.8 -1.7 
Finland 1987 - 1989 5.2 -9.9 
France 1986 - 1989 3.6 -7.0 
Italy 1984 - 1989 3.2 -9.4 
Japan 1987 - 1991 7.8 -24.1 
New Zealand 1983 - 1987 9.8 -4.6 
Sweden 1984 - 1989 4.9 -3.3 
Switzerland 1984 - 1990 9.9 -5.9 
Average  6.0 -6.8 
 Source: Harada (2003); * and ** indicate accumulated difference of trend GDP. 
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       There are several issues and factors combined to cause the financial and 
banking crises in Japan. Majority of them are originated from the mistaken 
policy, weak economic fundamentals, delayed and faulty financial deregulation 
and individual bank failure. Our factor analysis identifies three major factors, 
some factors are common to financial and banking sectors as a whole, some of 
them are directly related to banking sector and are exposed to the adverse 
changes in those factors and some of them are household spending related 
factors that affect the banking sector in a fashioned manner. There are, of course, 
other factors, which are not incorporated in the analysis due to inconsistency of 
data but are separately discussed later. 
       The paper is divided into 5 sections including introduction. Section 2 
discusses the data and methodology. Section 3 reports the empirical findings 
and analysis. Section 4 discusses the other factors that affect the banking and 
financial crises in Japan and section 5 concludes this paper with a brief 
discussion of policy implications for the banking sector of  Bangladesh.
2.      Data  and  Methodology
       The study is an empirical one. Both time series and panel data are used for 
the factor analysis covering the period from fiscal 1989 through 2003. It is to 
note that Japanese traditional fiscal year ends in March 31. The data are 
collected from different sources: the Bank of Japan, the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), Financial Supervisory/Services Agency and JBA (Japanese Bankers 
Association).
       The data thus collected are tabulated manually, which are analyzed by 
employing statistical tools factor analysis and Kendall's Coefficient of 
Concordance test. Financial techniques like ratio and percentage are also used. 
The non-parametric Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance test is used to rank 
the factors extracted from factor analysis that can be done by factor analysis too. 
We use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for extraction and Equamax (with 
Kaiser Normalization) for the rotation of the extracted components.               
For application of all techniques, the computer programs of Microsoft Excel 
and SPSS are used.
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3.     Empirical  Results  and Analysis
       Three components are extracted whose Eigen values are greater than or equal 
to 1. The Scree Plot (appendix A) indicates these components.  The factors under 
these components are exhibited in Rotated Space (appendix C). The Rotated 
Component Matrix (appendix B) indicates the relationship of principal 
component to each factor. The descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix 
between the factors are not provided here to conserve the space. It is worthwhile to 
mention that CPI has a positive correlation with component 2. and negative 
correlation with component 3. For ease of our analysis, this factor is discussed 
under the household spending relatated factors (hence component 3). We also 
discuss the factor “banks' holding of JGB” under component 2 to link it to the bank 
sensitive micro factors instead to the common macro factor.
       Eventually all these factors are ranked using Kendall's Coefficient of 
Concordance. The rank of these factors and the relevant test statistics are shown 
after the analysis of these factors.
       Three major components or factors are as follows:
       a) Common macro factors
       b) Bank sensitive micro factors
       c) Household spending related factors
Let us discuss these factors in details in the following section. 
       a) Common Macro Factors: These factors are common to the financial 
world and include:
       i. Domestic Goods Price Index (DGPI)
       ii. Land Price Index (LPI)
       iii. Export Index (EI)
       iv. Official Discount Rate (ODR) 
       v. Government Bond Yield (GBY)  
       vi. Nikkei Stock Average (NSA)
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       The DGPI is a leading Index showing the trend performance of large 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing enterprises. The index declined since 
the burst of the bubble. Japanese banks are highly vulnerable to the low 
performance of the large Japanese enterprises. 
       The LPI is the average indices of six major cities in Japan: Tokyo, Osaka, 
Nagoya, Yokohama, Fukuoka and Kyoto. Both the mega banks and the regional 
banks have made a large share of investment in the real estate industries.        
But since the burst of the bubbles, the declining trend in the land price index 
caused the valuation losses.
       The EI is lower than the bubble period. Japanese economy is highly export 
oriented. The quality of the products and the modernity of the production 
technologies give it the most competitive position in the external trade sector. 
However, the cooling of external economies like USA and China adversely 
affects the growth of export-led industries.
       The ODR is a significant determinant of monetary policy. The ODR cut in 
1986-88 indicates the adoption of easy monetary policy following the Plaza 
Accord. The ODR cut increased the money supply in the economy. There was a 
loan demand gap. Finding no alternatives, banks increased their investments to 
the real estate and stock markets.
       The GBY is a measure of long-term interest rate. Since the yield and the 
price move inversely, the rise in the yield decreases the value of the bonds. 
Pilling and Jopson (2004) argue that with the rising public debt and recent 
increase in long-term interest rates, there is the chance of jeopardizing both the 
banking and economic recovery.
       The Nikkei 225 Stock Average (NSA) is an important factor leading to 
success and failure of banks and financial institutions particularly which have 
got their stocks registered. The increase in the stock average strengthens the 
stock related gains of banks and financial institutions and the decrease enhances 
the losses.
       b) Bank Sensitive Micro Factors: The following are the bank sensitive 
micro factors which are directly related to the operation of the banks and 
financial institutions:
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       i. Stock Related  Loss
       ii. Bond Dependency
       iii. Banks'  Holding of  Japanese  Government  Bond (JGB) to  Assets
       iv. Corporate Bankruptcies
       v. Credit  Cost  Ratio
1       Stock related loss  is considered to be the most significant crisis factor to 
Japanese banking industry during the bubble period. The losses have been 
propelled by the burst of stock price bubbles in the early 1990s.
2       Bond dependency  has a significant relationship to the bond holding of JGB. 
With the increase of bond dependency of the government to finance its budgets, 
banks' tendency to buy JGB also grows tremendously. We find a significant      
(at 1 per cent level) positive correlation between the bond dependency and the 
banks' holding of JGB to assets. Figure 1 illustrates the trend of JGB issues and 
the rate of bond dependency. It also provides evidence that the government has 
relied on expansive fiscal policies since the early 1990s.
Source: MOF Highlights the Budget for FY 2004/online edition.
1. Stock related gains/losses (net realized amount) = Gains on sales of stocks and other securities  
losses on sales of stocks and other securities and  losses on devaluation of stocks and other securities.
2. Bond dependency is a ratio of government bond issues to total public spending.
 Figure 1 : Trend of JGB I ssues and Bond Dependency 
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       Figure 2 indicates that the government debt to GDP expands dramatically 
running currently (2004) at around 150 per cent to GDP with fiscal deficit of 
almost 8 per cent (not shown in the figure). Gross debt to GDP in other 
members of G-5 nations is less than half of the Japan's proportion.  
Japan's gross debt to GDP is followed by France, Germany, USA and UK. 
Source: OECD
       Banks' holding of JGB to assets represents both central and local 
government bonds to total assets of all banks. This is the major securities 
investment of all banks. 
Source: Financial Statements of Japanese Banks Calculations Made by Author, TA=Total Assets.
 
Figure 2 : General Govt. gross debt as % of GDP 
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       Figure 3 shows that banks, holding of JGB turns to increase since the early 
1990s. The JGBs are considered the most trusted financial instrument inside 
3Japan for its capital gains  and are attractive to the banks because of precisely 
defined payment streams and redemption terms. But, the international credit 
standing of JGBs has wavered and interest rates on local currency JGBs are 
higher than those on yen-denominated bonds (see also Tomita, 2001, 2003). 
There are other factors external to the growth of JGB holdings by banks e.g., the 
deterioration of banks portfolios and stock related loss continued since bubble. 
We find a significant correlation between stock loss and banks' JGB holdings. 
Table 2 gives an example of how the holding of JGB for a specified period can 
be harmful to Japanese banks due to change in the interest rates.
       
Table 2 : Interest Rate Risks for Securities Portfolio (Trillion Yen) 
 
Average Duration of JGB Holdings (years) Changes 
in 
interest 
rates 
(basis 
points) 
3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 
50 -1.5 -1.8 -2.0 -2.3 -2.5 -2.8 -3.0 -3.3 -3.5 
100 -3.0 -3.5 -4.0 -4.5 -5.0 -5.5 -6.0 -6.5 -7.0 
150 -4.5 -5.3 -6.0 -6.8 -7.5 -8.3 -9.0 -9.8 -10.5 
200 -6.0 -7.0 -8.0 -9.0 -10.0 -11.0 -12.0 
-
13.0 
-
14.0 
250 -7.5 -8.8 -10.0 -11.3 -12.5 -13.8 -15.0 
-
16.3 
-
17.5 
300 -9.0 -10.5 -12.0 -13.5 -15.0 -16.5 -18.0 
-
19.5 
-
21.0 
350 -10.5 -12.3 -14.0 -15.8 -17.5 -19.3 -21.0 
-
22.8 
-
24.5 
400 -12.0 -14.0 -16.0 -18.0 -20.0 -22.0 -21.0 
-
26.0 
-
28.0 
Source: Okina and Shiratsuka (2002). 
3. Bond Related Gains/Losses (net realized amount) = Gains on Sales of Bonds + Gains on 
Redemption of Bonds-losses on Sales of Bonds-losses on Redemption of Bonds-Losses on Devaluation 
of  Bonds.
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       High bankruptcies cause the corporate loans to continuously 
deteriorate. The cases of corporate bankruptcies are very high in Japan.         
It increases the NPLs of both local and city banks and further worsens the 
credit cost ratio of  banks. 
4       Credit cost ratio  (shown as the basis point) has increased since the 
bubble period due to huge losses on the disposal of NPLs. Two inherent factors 
cause the credit costs to expand: the high corporate bankruptcies and the loss 
on disposal of NPLs. Series of  business failures, management failures of 
banks and other financial institutions and securities and insurance companies 
in the early 1990s resulted in huge NPA/NPL burden for the banking industry 
in Japan. The NPA or NPL has been the major banking sector distress 
throughout the 1990s and has continued to be a serious issue for the policy 
makers even until recently. The regulatory authorities and the bankers have 
opted several policies to secure strong and sustainable rebound of the 
economy. The Japanese experience has shown us that the high credit cost ratio 
causes the failures and runs, which require large share of public capital 
injection, hostile mergers and acquisitions.
      c) Household Spending Related Factors: Personal consumption in Japan is 
the largest demand component accounting for 60 per cent of her GDP.  The growth 
of personal consumption of Japanese households is essential to offset the shocks in 
external trade and to strengthen the growth of financial sector.  Our factor analysis 
extracts three factors under this component. These are:
       i. Yen to Dollar Exchange Rate
       ii. Import Index
       iii. Consumer Price Index (CPI)
       Japanese economy is predominantly dependent on external economies. 
Such an economy is vulnerable to the volatility in the exchange rate. The general 
4. Credit Costs = Losses from Disposal of NPL including net transfers to APLL, net transfers to SLP, 
Loan Write-offs, Loan Write-offs in Trust Accounts, and NPL disposal in the extraordinary profit/loss 
account. Credit Cost Ratio = Credit Costs/Average Amount Outstanding of  Loans.
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Loan Write-offs, Loan Write-offs in Trust Accounts, and NPL disposal in the extraordinary profit/loss 
account. Credit Cost Ratio = Credit Costs/Average Amount Outstanding of  Loans.
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notion is that the yen appreciation is harmful to Japanese external trade. At the 
stronger yen, import is encouraged but export is discouraged. Our analysis 
validates this inference. The correlation between yen to dollar exchange rate and 
import index is higher (0.73) than that of export index (0.68). A stronger yen 
since the 1986 is also the outcome of Plaza Accord.  Horibe (2002) indicates that 
a 10 per cent yen devaluation results in a 1.5 per cent increase in export volumes 
and a 2.5 per cent decrease in import volumes giving a net positive impact of      
4 per cent on Japan's external trade. However, Horibe (2002) does not agree that 
yen appreciation substantially increases the volume of imports because 80 per 
cent of all imports are valued at foreign currency. He also finds that export is less 
vulnerable to price fluctuations. An executive of Mitsubishi Electric Corp. has 
put it euphemistically, “every 1 yen rise against dollar pushes down Mitsubishi 
Electric Corp's profit by 3 billion yen” (The Nikkei Weekly, 2004).
       The Import index has been positive for several years. Given the stronger 
yen, the import has been encouraged but effect has not sustainable because CPI 
has been downgraded gradually. Household spending has been rather adversely 
affected by the rise in import. The correlation of import index to export index is 
positive but highly negative to CPI. Consequently, the increase in import index 
has brought negative impact on the household expenditures.
       The CPI is a measure of inflation of the economy. Japanese economy has 
wavered with the deflationary trap since the 1990s and has experienced multiple 
(three times until 2005) recessions. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has not shifted its 
monetary easing to its tightening due to falling CPI. There are several reasons of 
falling CPI, for instance, the loss of confidence on economic revival, the 
declining consumption among the core generation who are in their 30s and 40s, 
wage cut, seniority based employment system, tax phobia, anxieties with public 
pension benefits and the growing burden of parenting, etc.
       Applying the Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance, these factors are 
ranked based on mean values as follows:
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       The test statistics shows that Kendall's coefficient of concordance is 
significant at 1 per cent level. This indicates that the factors extracted by our 
model significantly affect the banking crises in Japan. 
4.     Other  Factors  Affecting  Banking  and  Financial  Crises  in Japan
       The financial and banking crises in Japan have been evolved and 
developed from several other causes, which are not included in the factor 
analysis but affect the financial sector as a whole. These are discussed below.
i)      Financial  Deregulation
       The coincidence of financial liberalization or deregulation and the asset 
inflation and deflation has led the economists to argue that liberalization played 
a major role in the financial fragility during the late 1980s.
Table 3 : Rank of Factors According to Kendall's Coefficient 
 of Concordance 
 
Rank Factors Mean Rank 
1 Nikkei Stock Average 13.60 
2 Corporate Bankruptcies 13.40 
3 Stock Related Loss 11.90 
4 Govt. Bond Yield 10.40 
5 Yen to Dollar 8.47 
6 Land Price Index 8.20 
7 Credit Cost Ratio 8.13 
8 Export Index 7.57 
9 Import Index 6.37 
10 Domestic Goods Price Index 5.63 
11 CPI 5.30 
12 Bond Dependency 3.07 
13 Bond to Assets 1.87 
14 ODR 1.13 
 Table 4 : Test Statistics 
 
N 15 
Kendall's W 0.89 
Chi-Square 174.14 
df 13 
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       The high economic growth until mid 1970s is attributed to the heavily 
regulated postwar Japanese financial system. Since the mid 1970s, Japan 
needed to adopt deregulation measures, which was widespread particularly in 
the period 1980-96 (Shimizu, 2000). The deregulation caused significant 
banking problems that victimized not only Japan but also other major 
economies like France, Sweden, UK and U.S.A. (Posen, 2000).                     
The liberalization in the 1980s associated with the removal of binding portfolio 
constraints permitted banks and other depository institutions to take riskier 
investment and loan portfolios, including high loan to value ratios. 
       Financial deregulation was compulsory for the Japanese economy but it 
lacked effective implementation. In most cases, the deregulation in Japan was 
incomplete and very slow associated with conservative approach remaining 
unchanged. Hoshi and Patrick (2000) argue that the deregulation did not bring 
much free entry, new enterprises and vigorous innovative activity in Japan as it 
did in other developed countries. The faulty deregulations namely, relaxation of 
interest rates, easy flow of international capital and expansion of the activities of 
financial institutions, etc. caused an imperfect process of transformation from 
the bank centered financial system to the market oriented financial system. 
Many alternative financial instruments were introduced that enabled large 
corporate industrial borrowers to raise funds from domestic and foreign bond 
markets and other capital issues gradually reduce dependence on traditional 
indirect/bank financing. In this course, mega banks loosing their big clients 
began lending to small and medium size enterprises and to real estate companies 
on a  speculative basis that produced stock and land price bubbles that burst in 
the late 1980s. As a consequence, the small and medium sized firms had 
difficulty paying back their loans and thus, the non-performing assets of the 
banking system rose rapidly. The financial deregulation combined with lax 
supervision, provision of explicit and implicit deposit guarantees and 
regulatory forbearance in the crisis period together with monetary easing 
5further multiplied the miseries of the banks and financial world .
5.    See Cargill and Royama (1998), Cargill (2000) and Dekle and Kletzer (2003) for more on faulty 
deregulation measures.
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       In addition to the faulty deregulation measures, reluctance to depart from 
the convoy arrangement, inefficient private financial institutions, irresponsible 
corporate governance under cross- shareholding relationships and government 
financial intermediations caused long-term banking crises in Japan.
ii.      Policy Failures during 1970-80s Periods Associated with Shifting of Bank 
Lending
       There have been several policy failures on the part of the BOJ during 1970-80 
periods. These are expansive fiscal policies, excessive easy monetary policies, 
Plaza and Louvre Accords, the delayed response to twin bubbles and the delayed 
shifting to tight policies and credit regulation, etc.
       Apparently, the Plaza Accord, which was signed between world five giant 
economies, France, Germany, Japan, UK and USA in September 22, 1985 at 
Hotel Plaza, USA, claimed to deregulate both fiscal and monetary policies and 
to modernize the financial market of Japan and Germany. But, the inherent 
objectives were (i) to depreciate US dollar to reduce US huge trade deficits with 
other countries particularly highly with Japan and to some extent with Germany 
and (ii) to lessen the extent of large and growing current account surpluses of 
Japan and Germany. Table 5 demonstrates this evidence. Table 5 shows that 
there is a negative correlation between US and other OECD countries with 
regard to current account balances.
       
       Mikitan (2000) puts that in carrying out Plaza Accord, the Japanese 
government and the BOJ implemented an easy and mistaken monetary policy. 
Table 5 : Trends of Current Account Balances, Standard Deviation and 
Correlation with USA 
 
Country   ‘80-
82 
‘83-
85 
‘86-
88 
‘89-
91 
‘92-
94 
’95-
97 
’98-
00 
2001 2002 ó r 
US 0.0 -2.2 -3.0 -1.0 -1.2 -1.5 -3.2 -3.9 -4.8 1.54 n.a. 
Euro Area -0.9 0.4 0.7 -0.6 -0.3 1.0 0.1 0.5 1.3 0.63 -
0.53 
Japan  0.0 2.7 3.4 1.8 2.9 1.9 2.7 2.1 2.9 1.0 -
0.64 
other 
OECD 
-2.5 -0.5 -1.8 -2.0 -2.1 0.0 -0.3 1.5 1.0 1.44 -
0.80 
Note: ó indicates standard deviation and r indicates the correlation, n.a. – not applicable 
Source : Global Development Finance (2003), P.-38. 
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6Cargill (2000) also indicates that the second  monetary policy failure after 
WWII is attributed to the Plaza Accord.
       Following the deregulation and mistaken monetary policy, alternative 
financial instruments were introduced that enabled large internationally 
oriented firms move to raise capitals directly from the domestic and foreign 
bond markets. Banks, loosing these mega borrowers, shifted their lending to 
small and medium size enterprises and relied heavily on stock related and land 
related gains. As the asset price boom collapsed, the small and medium size 
enterprises failed to pay back their loans. As a result, banks were burdened with 
huge NPAs/NPLs. Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000)  find that the bank lending to 
small firms and to real estate based enterprise has increased dramatically in 
1987-95 periods compared to 1977-86 periods. All types of banks including city 
banks, Long Term Credit Bank (LTCB), trust banks and regional banks have 
increased their share of lending to these sectors. It was largely the regional 
banks making huge real estate related lending. The major burden fo NPLs 
originated from the failure of these banks to recover their investments from 
small firms and real estate enterprises. Some of the large banks came to rescue 
these failed banks but again got trouble after taking over them.
iii)    Deflation or Weak Financial System: Cause-Effect Dilemma and Conflicting 
Measures
       Amongst the major factors leading to banking/financial crises in Japan, 
weak/vulnerable financial system and deflation are frequently cited by the 
economists. Though opinions are divided as regards which of these two is the 
cause and what is the effect, in fact, both deflation and weak financial system 
contributed to the financial/banking crises in Japan. 
       Among the domestic economists in the anti-deflation camp are Iwata 
Kikuo, Uekusa Kazuhide and Fukao Mitsuhiro who attribute the sources of 
deflation to a failed monetary policy and weak demand (Nariai, 2003). The BOJ 
claims that chronic deflation is unthreatening phenomenon. But it has been 
criticized fiercely as it aggravates the debtors' burden who borrowed heavily 
during the bubble period. According to the reflationists (anti-deflation camp), 
6.    The first monetary policy failure was in the early 1970s.
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this is the route cause of the build up of non-performing loans. These economists 
suggest a further easing of the monetary reins. They suggest an inflation 
targeting combined with fiscal stimulus, which can be an effective remedy for 
deflation. They argue that overcoming deflation would resolve or at least 
facilitate the write-off of NPLs. Haruhiko Kuroda, former Vice-Finance 
Minister proposes setting an inflation target of 3 per cent to be achieved over 
three years. Tasker, the Japanese expert in the US administration, also supports 
the views of this camp. He puts that it is the central bank's duty to break the cycle 
of falling prices and growing indebtedness. He blames the BOJ for being 
indecisive when deflation first appeared as early as 1995. 
       The anti-inflation camp acknowledges the necessity of easing deflation 
but gives more emphasis on resolving the bad loan crisis. They argue that 
banks have been given so many concessions earlier. Thus, the economists 
provide the conflicting suggestions to the MOF and the BOJ. These 
suggestions have appeared at times in different media until recently. In fact, 
part of Japan's decade-long policy paralysis originates from the tussle between 
these opposing camps.
       Deflation is generally defined as a state of continuous decline in prices.   
The opinions are again subdivided on the issue of the causes and effects of 
deflation, and about the policy responses that are needed. Deflation is a result of 
weak demand which is, of course, the effect of other factors including weak 
economic fundamentals, for example, the Plaza Accord, faulty deregulation etc. 
Such policy shortcomings entitle the inflows of cheap imports and cause to 
reduce the domestic prices. However, if the imported items compete themselves 
in such a fashion that some of them win more demands with even higher prices 
then the overall effect is not necessarily deflationary (Yamamoto, 2002).  
Jopson and Pilling (2004) find that no key measures are opted to transmit a 
positive impact on the consumer spending to spur domestic demand. The BOJ 
assumes that there is still a gap between excess capacity (which left over from 
the bubble years) and subdued demand.
       The proper treatment to deflation is indispensable to avoid the following 
negative effects to the economy: (i) the deterioration of profit ratios and frequent 
business failures (ii) the increase in unemployment rate geared by falling CPI 
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(iii) the accelerating asset deflation associated with high corporate debt burden 
and (iv) the risk of setbacks for negative heritage disposal process such as NPLs. 
       Heizo Takena, during his time as financial services minister, argues that the 
disposal of bad loans would have serious side effects and that base money 
expansion as a tool of easy monetary policy by the BOJ could limit these.        
He urges the BOJ to pursue looser monetary policy until the deflation is beaten. 
But, the measure is already proved to be ineffective. Currently, there is more 
than 30 trillion yen in the market but there is no relation between base money 
and broad money. In the last several years, the growth of broad money has been 
relatively low as compared to the growth of the base money resulting in the 
decline of credit multiplier. An easy monetary policy to reduce deflation, 
therefore, does not always work. 
       In the fiscal side, an expansionary fiscal policy increases the national 
government burden under huge deficits and outstanding liabilities. Among the   
G-5 nations, Japan is running the highest level of public debt to GDP.                 
An expansionary fiscal policy will not work anymore. It rather needs to choose a 
sound financial system that may persuade the banks to begin financing enterprises 
and to remove misunderstanding that the credit crunch on the part of the bankers is 
liable to declining domestic investment and domestic demand. 
       Banks should try more unorthodox policies, but not on speculative basis, 
like general trading of foreign currencies, buying foreign bonds (such as Japan 
is the highest buyer of US government bonds) and domestic shares or even 
buying property.
iv)     NPL  Crisis :  How  to  Deal  It
       Non-performing loans or non-performing assets, used interchangeably, are the 
major problems of Japanese banks. Up until 2002, the ratio of  non-performing 
loans at major banks was around 9%, which declined to 6.5% as of September 30, 
2003 and the government called the major banks (except regional banks) to halve 
their NPLs to 4% of outstanding lending by March 31, 2005. While the most of the 
major banks are on good track, the regional banks are far behind the target.
       Banks and regulators are further divided as to the available solutions for 
disposing NPLs. Four types of solutions are recommended by both groups: (i) to 
rehabilitate the failed borrowers (ii) to sell the NPLs to sound/healthy banks through 
M&A (iii) to write down the asset value or (iv) to reduce the dividend payment. 
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       As regards the above solutions, policy makers on the extreme side, suggest 
the banks not to extend loans to failed borrowers particularly, which have no 
potential for growth. The second option to sell NPL to healthy/sound banks also 
proved to be ineffective, because these sound banks may fail by acquiring a 
failed bank. The third option for banks facing NPL crisis is to write down the 
value of collateral. Most of the banks are relying on the fourth option.
v)     Weak Banking
       Japanese banks are simultaneously the world's largest by assets and world's 
weakest by profits. The expense ratio, expressed in terms of general and 
administrative expenses to operating or gross income, is very high although it 
has been declining since fiscal year 1997 as a result of aggressive measures like, 
personnel costs cuts, mergers and the close of branches.
       The gross lending margin and other income, fees, trading profits from fixed 
income securities and foreign exchange operations are not satisfactory. We find 
that profitability measures namely, operating profits to assets, net income to 
total assets and net interest income on loans of Japanese banks are 
unsustainable. Operating profits to total assets increased since FY 1994 but 
declined again in FY 1998 and continued to stable above 0.5% afterwards. 
Figure 4 shows the profitability measures of Japanese banks.
Source: Financial Statements of Japanese Banks, author's calculation.
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       Japanese banks are troubled with regulatory problem, especially capital 
position. The capital adequacy ratio has been deteriorated and manipulated in 
several ways by banks (Fukao, 2004). To meet the BIS ratio requirement, 
banks try to inflate their capitals by (i) using historical cost book-keeping of 
equity portfolios or unrealized capital gains (ii) under-reserving against bad 
loans and (iii) using DTAs (Deferred Tax Assets, i.e., the expected future tax 
refunds). While most of the major banks have an average of 40% DTAs, 
majority of the regional banks have more than 50% to 97.3% in their core 
capital (The Nikkei Weekly, 2004). Banks' financial strength index is also the 
weakest among the  G-5 nations:
       
       
       In addition to the above mentioned factors, the following factors also 
contribute to the banking/financial crises in Japan:
       a) Banks provide finance to the companies without much attention to 
their asset qualities.
       b) Japanese banks hold hidden or latent capital comprising equities in 
non-financial businesses.
       c) Given the slow growth of lending margins, there is no dimension of 
fee-based services or no diversification of bank services.
       d) Banks and financial institutions lack transparency and accountability. 
The Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) has recently (2005) issued 
the business improvement order to the fourth largest bank (recently 
merged with the second largest bank) for concealing the genuine 
figure of  NPL.
Table 6 : Moody’s Weighted Average Bank Financial Strength Index 
 
Country  Dec., 2001 Dec., 2002 Dec., 2003 
France  71.9 74.2 71.2 
Germany  61.7 54.2 46.7 
Japan  16.7 12.9 12.0 
UK 83.8 83.8 83.3 
USA 77.1 75.0 75.0 
Source: IMF (2004). 
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5.     Concluding  Remarks  and  Policy Implications for Bangladesh
       Banking crisis may occur from several sources: due to contagion, due to 
weak economic fundaments and weak macroeconomic performances. There are 
several factors that directly or indirectly affect the banking performance.       
The extraordinary easy monetary and fiscal policies, the delayed and faulty 
deregulation measures and weak banking activities lead to the banking failure 
and thus affect the financial world and economy as a whole. The banking 
problems that have plagued Japan since 1990 represent the biggest financial 
turmoil in recent history (Frankel, 1998). 
       We find that the banking/financial crisis in Japan has originated mainly 
from the policy failures. The transitional and developing economies, where the 
financial system is gradually transforming into more market-oriented, should 
note this matter in designing their macroeconomic policies. The appropriate 
policy formulation to avoid financial crisis is not merely important for the 
overall financial world but also important for the economic stability. 
       Among the several problems, loan default is a frequently cited banking 
problem in Bangladesh. All types of  local banks, NCBs, PCBs and DFIs, are 
already burdened with huge NPL. The NPL ratios to total loans of these banks 
excluding foreign banks are above 20 per cent. The so-called culture of loan 
default virtually stems from willful default by the political leaders or other 
dominant business leaders. In the corporate culture, Bangladesh does not have 
recognized cross-shareholding arrangements between banks and industrial 
organizations like Japan, but there is an implied relationship between the two. 
The owners of the banks and industries represent various political parties and 
they dominate bank lending. Thus, unlike Japan, the NPL crisis in Bangladeshi 
banks is rather a political crisis. The government has taken strong policy 
measures loan defaulters and offending bank officials. Instances are there in 
both cases, but too small in proportion to mention. In the late 1986, a more 
comprehensive program of loan recovery was also initiated. 
       Like Japanese banks, Bangladeshi banks also have both regulatory 
problems. While the capital adequacy ratios of PCBs have reached at 
satisfactory levels, the ratios of  NCBs are alarmingly low.
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       Our study finds a high correlation between the stock and real estate markets 
crash and the banking/financial crises. While Bangladesh experienced the stock 
market crash in the mid 1990s, the collapse in the real estate market is yet to be 
experienced. In Bangladesh, stock bubble and burst were led by the speculators 
who manipulated the prices and left stock trading in crisis after making 
speculative gains. Since then, numerous policies are experimented to bring back 
the confidence of investors, but stock averages of two exchanges (DSE and CSE) 
are still far below the bubble period of 1996. The experience indicates that boom 
precedes burst. Given the experience of boom and burst in the stock market, the 
recent trend in housing and land related investments by banks and financial 
institutions would no doubt disrupt the lending environment. The future 
researchers may focus on the trend of real estate related lending and its possible 
impact (positive or negative) on the financial sector. 
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Appendix B. Rotated Component Matrix 
 
 
Component 
  1 2 3 
Bond to assets -0.982 0.631 -0.083 
DGPI 0.862 -0.416 0.276 
LPI 0.762 -0.494 0.264 
Bond dependency -0.703 0.541 -0.38 
Export index 0.697 -0.275 0.634 
ODR 0.628 -0.554 0.380 
NSA 0.539 -0.45 0.527 
Credit cost ratio -0.164 0.775 -0.308 
CPI -0.001 0.705 -0.665 
Corporate bankruptcy  -0.288 0.702 -0.461 
Stock related loss -0.396 0.683 0.205 
GBY 0.601 -0.651 0.435 
Yen to dollar 0.18 -0.016 0.887 
Import index 0.201 -0.281 0.862 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Equamax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 10 iterations. 
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